

CSE227 – Graduate Computer Security

Web Centralization + TLS I

UC San Diego

Housekeeping

General course things to know

- Midpoint check-in document is due **5/8 at 11:59pm PT**
 - Introduction (frame the problem)
 - Related work section (should include ~5 – 10 relevant papers)
 - Research plan, current status, what's left to do
- Midpoint check-in meetings will happen week 7, so be prepared for that
- Logistics
 - **Ask for resources by Friday**
 - **No class next Tuesday!**
 - **Class via Zoom next Thursday**, second paper [optional]

Today's lecture

Learning Objectives

- Talk about web centralization!
- Talk about RSA, TLS, efficient factoring of numbers with shared primes, etc.
- Start discussing the Ps and Qs paper, and why the paper is so significant

The most prominent trackers

- Who is the most prominent tracker on the Internet?

The most prominent trackers

- Who is the most prominent tracker on the Internet?
 - Google! Through Google Analytics.
- Today, **>70% of Top 1M websites load Google analytics**
 - Increased reliance on a small handful of players: Google, Facebook, Amazon...
- Today's language: hyperscalar. What's a hyperscalar?

| Domain | Top 1M | Domain | Top 1M |
|----------------------|--------|-----------------------|--------|
| google-analytics.com | 67.8% | ajax.googleapis.com | 23.1% |
| gstatic.com | 50.1% | googlesyndication.com | 19.6% |
| fonts.googleapis.com | 42.8% | googleadservices.com | 14.1% |
| doubleclick.net | 40.5% | twitter.com | 12.8% |
| facebook.com | 33.7% | fbcdn.net | 10.7% |
| google.com | 33.2% | adnxs.com | 10.5% |
| facebook.net | 27.4% | | |

Discussion: On Centralization...

- Is centralization good for the Internet or bad for the Internet?
- What kinds of *benefits* would you want from centralization? What kinds of *downsides* can you see from increased centralization?

Centralization

The Internet preliminaries, writ large

- What is a hosting provider?
 - What are some examples?
- What is a DNS provider?
 - What are some examples?
- What is a Certificate Authority?
 - What are some examples?
- What is a CDN?
 - What are some examples?
 - What's the difference between a hosting provider and a CDN?

This paper: centralization

- What might be a layman's definition of centralization?

This paper: centralization


- What might be a layman's definition of centralization?
 - "The concentration of an Internet function on a small number of providers."

This paper: centralization

- What might be a layman's definition of centralization?
 - "The concentration of an Internet function on a small number of providers."
- Why does that definition kinda suck?

This paper: centralization

- What might be a layman's definition of centralization?
 - "The concentration of an Internet function on a small number of providers."
- Why does that definition kinda suck?
 - *What is concentration? What is small?*
- Really, we want a much more concrete definition by which we can ascertain centralization.



Azerbaijan and Hong Kong?

The Proposed Solution

- What do the authors propose as a mechanism to measure centralization?

The Proposed Solution

- What do the authors propose as a mechanism to measure centralization?
 - Earth Movers Distance (EMD); between two distributions

The Proposed Solution

- What do the authors propose as a mechanism to measure centralization?
 - Earth Movers Distance (EMD); between two distributions
- What is EMD?


The Proposed Solution

- What do the authors propose as a mechanism to measure centralization?
 - Earth Movers Distance (EMD); between two distributions
- What is EMD?
 - Metric for amount of "work" to transform one distribution to another

Stage 3: Compute inter-segment distances

The Pro

- What do t
- Earth M
- What is EI
- Metric f



zation?

other

Earth mover's distance is an intuitive metric that denotes the minimum cost flow between two distributions (in other words, minimum work that needs to be done to turn one into the other)

The Proposed Solution

- What do the authors propose as a mechanism to measure centralization?
 - Earth Movers Distance (EMD); between two distributions
- What is EMD?
 - Metric for amount of "work" to transform one distribution to another
- What are the two distributions the authors are seeking to compare?

The Proposed Solution


- What do the authors propose as a mechanism to measure centralization?
 - Earth Movers Distance (EMD); between two distributions
- What is EMD?
 - Metric for amount of “work” to transform one distribution to another
- What are the two distributions the authors are seeking to compare?
 - *Observed distribution* — how can you observe “hosting” provider?
 - *Reference distribution* — what is the reference distribution they propose?

This paper: regionalization

- What is regionalization, and how is it different from centralization?

This paper: regionalization

- What is regionalization, and how is it different from centralization?
- Geopolitical dependence *within* and *between* countries
 - Providers get scored based on their *usage* and *endemicity*
- *How do the authors define usage?*
- *How do the authors define endemicity?*
- What is the endemicity ratio?



Data collection

- Which websites does the paper analyze?

Data collection

- Which websites does the paper analyze?
 - Top 10K websites from each 150 countries.
 - Where'd they get the 10K websites from?
 - **What assumptions are the authors making when making this measurement choice?**

Data collection

- Which websites does the paper analyze?
 - Top 10K websites from each 150 countries.
 - Where'd they get the 10K websites from?
 - **What assumptions are the authors making when making this measurement choice?**
- The gist is: measuring things is quite hard, actually.

Hosting Providers




Figure 5: Hosting Provider Centralization by Country—Europe is consistently the least centralized, while Asia as a whole shows substantial variance. Other continents do not tend towards any extremes.

- 90% of websites are hosted by fewer than 206 providers in every country!
- Who is the most prominent player in hosting?

Hosting Providers




Figure 5: Hosting Provider Centralization by Country—Europe is consistently the least centralized, while Asia as a whole shows substantial variance. Other continents do not tend towards any extremes.

- 90% of websites are hosted by fewer than 206 providers in every country!
- Who is the most prominent player in hosting? **Cloudflare**

Hosting Providers




Figure 5: Hosting Provider Centralization by Country—Europe is consistently the least centralized, while Asia as a whole shows substantial variance. Other continents do not tend towards any extremes.

- 90% of websites are hosted by fewer than 206 providers in every country!
- Who is the most prominent player in hosting? **Cloudflare**
- What is the most centralized country by hosting provider?

Regionalization has many tendrils!

- Language ties
- Colonial ties
- Old political ties
 - Czech Republic and Slovakia
 - Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) — erstwhile USSR

Lots more in the paper...

- DNS centralization — looks a lot like hosting
- CA centralization — only a handful of global CAs dominate the entire ecosystem.
 - Why?
- **Discussion point:** Do we want more CAs? Why or why not?

Discussion

- What does this paper tell you about trust?
- What did you enjoy, or not enjoy about this paper?
- Did this paper make you challenge your assumptions?

Break Time + Attendance



Codeword:
CentralCafe

<https://tinyurl.com/cse227-attend>

RSA

Public-key Cryptosystems

- What is a public-key cryptosystem?

Public-key Cryptosystems

- What is a public-key cryptosystem?
 - A public-key cryptosystem is one where cryptography (e.g., encryption, integrity) is achieved through *pairs* of keys, a public key and a private key.

Public-key Cryptosystems

- What is a public-key cryptosystem?
 - A public-key cryptosystem is one where cryptography (e.g., encryption, integrity) is achieved through *pairs* of keys, a public key and a private key.
- What is a public key?

Public-key Cryptosystems

- What is a public-key cryptosystem?
 - A public-key cryptosystem is one where cryptography (e.g., encryption, integrity) is achieved through *pairs* of keys, a public key and a private key.
- What is a public key?
- What is a private key?

Public-key Cryptosystems

- What is a public-key cryptosystem?
 - A public-key cryptosystem is one where cryptography (e.g., encryption, integrity) is achieved through *pairs* of keys, a public key and a private key.
- What is a public key?
- What is a private key?
- What is the fundamental assumption of public keys and private keys?

Public-key Cryptosystems

- What is a public-key cryptosystem?
 - A public-key cryptosystem is one where cryptography (e.g., encryption, integrity) is achieved through *pairs* of keys, a public key and a private key.
- What is a public key?
- What is a private key?
- What is the fundamental assumption of public keys and private keys?
 - Two keys are easy to generate, but discovering private key (d) from the public key (e) is computationally *infeasible*

What is RSA?

What is RSA?

RSA (Rivest-Shamir-Adleman) is a public-key cryptosystem used for secure data transmission.

How RSA works



Alice



Bob

How RSA works



Alice

- Alice's keypair generation scheme:
1. Generate two numbers, p and q . What is true about these numbers?



Bob

How RSA works



Alice

- Alice's keypair generation scheme:
1. Generate two numbers, p and q . What is true about these numbers?
 2. Compute $N = p * q$, this is known as the modulus. Is N public or private?



Bob

How RSA works



Alice

- Alice's keypair generation scheme:
1. Generate two numbers, p and q . What is true about these numbers?
 2. Compute $N = p * q$, this is known as the modulus. Is N public or private?
 3. Compute $\lambda(N)$, $\text{LCM}(p-1, q-1)$, called the totient function



Bob

How RSA works



Alice

- Alice's keypair generation scheme:
1. Generate two numbers, p and q . What is true about these numbers?
 2. Compute $N = p * q$, this is known as the modulus. Is N public or private?
 3. Compute $\lambda(N)$, $\text{LCM}(p-1, q-1)$, called the totient function
 4. Choose e , such that e and $\lambda(N)$ are co-prime. What it mean for two numbers to be co-prime?



Bob

How RSA works

Alice's keypair generation scheme:

1. Generate two numbers, p and q . What is true about these numbers?
2. Compute $N = p * q$, this is known as the modulus. Is N public or private?
3. Compute $\lambda(N)$, $\text{LCM}(p-1, q-1)$, called the totient function
4. Choose e , such that e and $\lambda(N)$ are co-prime. What it mean for two numbers to be co-prime?
5. Compute $d \equiv (e^{-1}) \pmod{\lambda(N)}$, d is the modular multiplicative inverse of $e \pmod{\lambda(N)}$



Alice



Bob

How RSA works



Alice

In the end, Alice has two keys:

Public Key: (e, N)

Private Key: (d, N)



Bob

How RSA works



Alice

In the end, Alice has two keys:

Public Key: $(e_{\text{alice}}, N_{\text{alice}})$

Private Key: $(d_{\text{alice}}, N_{\text{alice}})$

Bob also has two keys:

Public Key: $(e_{\text{bob}}, N_{\text{bob}})$

Private Key: $(d_{\text{bob}}, N_{\text{bob}})$



Bob

How RSA works

Alice wants to send an encrypted message to Bob. How would she do that?

Pub:($e_{\text{alice}}, N_{\text{alice}}$)
Priv: ($d_{\text{alice}}, N_{\text{alice}}$)



Alice

Pub:($e_{\text{bob}}, N_{\text{bob}}$)
Priv: ($d_{\text{bob}}, N_{\text{bob}}$)



Bob

How RSA works

Alice wants to send an encrypted message to Bob. How would she do that?

Pub:(e_alice,N_alice)
Priv: (d_alice,N_alice)

Pub:(e_bob,N_bob)
Priv: (d_bob,N_bob)



Alice

$$x = m^{e_bob} \text{ mod } N$$



Bob

How RSA works

Bob wants to sign a message m to Alice. How would he do that?

Pub:($e_{\text{alice}}, N_{\text{alice}}$)
Priv: ($d_{\text{alice}}, N_{\text{alice}}$)



Alice

Pub:($e_{\text{bob}}, N_{\text{bob}}$)
Priv: ($d_{\text{bob}}, N_{\text{bob}}$)



Bob

How RSA works

Bob wants to sign a message m to Alice. How would he do that?

Pub: $(e_{\text{alice}}, N_{\text{alice}})$
Priv: $(d_{\text{alice}}, N_{\text{alice}})$

Pub: $(e_{\text{bob}}, N_{\text{bob}})$
Priv: $(d_{\text{bob}}, N_{\text{bob}})$



Alice

$m, m^{d_{\text{bob}}} \bmod N$



Bob

Breaking RSA is hard

- If you wanted to break RSA (e.g., discover the private key) given just public key material: (e, N) , how would you do it?

Breaking RSA is hard

- If you wanted to break RSA (e.g., discover the private key) given just public key material: (e, N) , how would you do it?
- You would need to decompose N into its prime factors, p and q . And forward compute. **This problem, called the Integer factorization problem, is computationally very hard to do.**

Breaking RSA is hard

- If you wanted to break RSA (e.g., discover the private key) given just public key material: (e, N) , how would you do it?
 - You would need to decompose N into its prime factors, p and q . And forward compute. **This problem, called the Integer factorization problem, is computationally very hard to do.**
- Is breaking RSA in this way always impossible, then?

Breaking RSA is hard

- If you wanted to break RSA (e.g., discover the private key) given just public key material: (e, N) , how would you do it?
 - You would need to decompose N into its prime factors, p and q . And forward compute. **This problem, called the Integer factorization problem, is computationally very hard to do.**
- Is breaking RSA in this way always impossible, then?
 - No, if your bit-size is small, then you need less computational power
 - And a million other side channels.... see padding oracles, poor implementations, etc.

What is Transport Layer Security (TLS)?

What is Transport Layer Security (TLS)?

“TLS: Widely adopted security protocol designed to facilitate privacy and data security for communication over the Internet.” – Cloudflare

How TLS (1.3) works (vaguely)



Client


Pub: e1
Priv: d1




Server

Pub: e2
Priv: d2


How TLS (1.3) works (vaguely)




How TLS (1.3) works (vaguely)



How TLS (1.3) works (vaguely)



How TLS (1.3) works (vaguely)



<https://tls13.xargs.org/>

Mining Your Ps and Qs: Detection of Widespread Weak Keys in Network Devices

A few words on this paper...

- This is a UCSD paper!
 - Nadia Heninger is one of the lead authors, done when she was a postdoc here at UCSD
 - The other lead was *my* postdoc advisor, done when he was a first-year graduate student (much like you!)
- This paper won best paper at USENIX Security 2012
- This paper won the USENIX Security Test-of-Time award in 2022
- Needless to say... it's a very important computer security paper. Why?

A few more words on this paper...

- IMO, one of the greatest paper titles of all time
- What does “minding your Ps and Qs” mean?

A few more words on this paper...

- IMO, one of the greatest paper titles of all time
- What does “minding your Ps and Qs” mean?
- So what does “mining your Ps and Qs” mean?
 - Factoring weak RSA public key information!

An RSA “vulnerability”

- This paper exploits a “vulnerability” in the RSA cryptosystem’s underlying assumptions. What assumption does it violate?

An RSA “vulnerability”

- This paper exploits a “vulnerability” in the RSA cryptosystem’s underlying assumptions. What assumption does it violate?
 - That public modulus N will **never share any factors with any other N .**

An RSA “vulnerability”

- This paper exploits a “vulnerability” in the RSA cryptosystem’s underlying assumptions. What assumption does it violate?
 - That public modulus N will **never share any factors with any other N .**
- Why is sharing factors so bad?

An RSA “vulnerability”

- This paper exploits a “vulnerability” in the RSA cryptosystem’s underlying assumptions. What assumption does it violate?
 - That public modulus N will **never share any factors with any other N .**
- Why is sharing factors so bad?
 - GCDs are efficiently computable (see Euclid’s algorithm)
 - If N_1 and N_2 share a factor p , the GCD between N_1 and N_2 would be p , and the key can be trivially broken

Who cares if you break someone's private key?

- What scenarios do the authors describe?

Who cares if you break someone's private key?

- What scenarios do the authors describe?
 - Passive attacker: If key exchange is RSA, then a passive attacker can decrypt **entire encrypted session** after the fact
 - Active attacker: If key exchange is Diffie-Hellman, passive adversary won't work, but active attacker (e.g., MiTM) can modify / decrypt traffic

How do we find these vulnerable keys?

- What is network scanning?

```
root@kali:~/home/spect# nmap -sV scanme.nmap.org -oX /home/spect/scanResults.xml
Starting Nmap 7.00 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-01-18 23:25 +01
Nmap scan report for scanme.nmap.org (45.33.32.156)
Host is up (0.21s latency).
Other addresses for scanme.nmap.org (not scanned): 2600:3c01::f03c:91ff:fe18:bb2f
Not shown: 987 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
25/tcp    filtered smtp
80/tcp    open  http
135/tcp   filtered msrpc
139/tcp   filtered netbios-ssn
445/tcp   filtered microsoft-ds
593/tcp   filtered http-rpc-epmap
1068/tcp  filtered instl_bootc
4444/tcp  filtered krb524
5800/tcp  filtered vnc-http
5900/tcp  filtered vnc
9929/tcp  open  nping-echo
31337/tcp open  tcpwrapped
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:Ubuntu:Ubuntu 2.13 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 39.35 seconds
```



How do we find these vulnerable keys?

- What is network scanning?
- How does network scanning work to identify TCP hosts?



```
root@kali:~/home/spect# nmap -sV scanme.nmap.org -oX /home/spect/scanResults.xml
Starting Nmap 7.00 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-01-18 23:25 +01
Nmap scan report for scanme.nmap.org (45.33.32.156)
Host is up (0.21s latency).
Other addresses for scanme.nmap.org (not scanned): 2600:3c01::f03c:91ff:fe18:bb2f
Not shown: 987 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
25/tcp    filtered smtp
80/tcp    open  http
135/tcp   filtered msrpc
139/tcp   filtered netbios-ssn
445/tcp   filtered microsoft-ds
593/tcp   filtered http-rpc-epmap
1068/tcp  filtered instl_bootc
4444/tcp  filtered krb524
5800/tcp  filtered vnc-http
5900/tcp  filtered vnc
9929/tcp  open  nping-echo
31337/tcp open  tcpwrapped
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:Ubuntu:Ubuntu 2.13 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/.
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 39.35 seconds
```

NMAP

How do we find these vulnerable keys?

- What is network scanning?
- How does network scanning work to identify TCP hosts?
- What was the search space the authors searched in this paper?




The image shows a terminal window with the output of an NMAP scan. A large, stylized blue eye graphic is overlaid on the right side of the terminal output. The terminal text includes the command used, the scan results for scanme.nmap.org, and the NMAP logo.

```
root@kali:~/home/spect# nmap -sV scanme.nmap.org -oX /home/spect/scanResults.xml
Starting Nmap 7.00 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-01-18 23:25 +01
Nmap scan report for scanme.nmap.org (45.33.32.156)
Host is up (0.21s latency).
Other addresses for scanme.nmap.org (not scanned): 2600:3c01::f03c:91ff:fe18:bb2f
Not shown: 987 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
25/tcp    filtered smtp
80/tcp    open  http
135/tcp   filtered msrpc
139/tcp   filtered netbios
445/tcp   filtered microsoft-ds
593/tcp   filtered http-rpc-epmap
1068/tcp  filtered instl_bootc
4444/tcp  filtered krb524
5800/tcp  filtered vnc-http
5900/tcp  filtered vnc
9929/tcp  open  nping-echo
31337/tcp open  tcpwrapped
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:Ubuntu:Ubuntu2.13 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 39.35 seconds
```


How do we find these vulnerable keys?

- What is network scanning?
- How does network scanning work to identify TCP hosts?
- What was the search space the authors searched in this paper?
 - How long did it take the authors to scan the IPv4 Internet?



```
root@kali:~/home/spect# nmap -sV scanme.nmap.org -oX /home/spect/scanResults.xml
Starting Nmap 7.00 ( https://nmap.org ) at 2021-01-18 23:25 +01
Nmap scan report for scanme.nmap.org (45.33.32.156)
Host is up (0.21s latency).
Other addresses for scanme.nmap.org (not scanned): 2600:3c01::f03c:91ff:fe18:bb2f
Not shown: 987 closed ports
PORT      STATE SERVICE
22/tcp    open  ssh
25/tcp    filtered smtp
80/tcp    open  http
135/tcp   filtered msrpc
139/tcp   filtered netbios-ssn
445/tcp   filtered microsoft-ds
593/tcp   filtered http-rpc-epmap
1068/tcp  filtered instl_bootc
4444/tcp  filtered krb524
5800/tcp  filtered vnc-http
5900/tcp  filtered vnc
9929/tcp  open  nping-echo
31337/tcp open  tcpwrapped
Service Info: OS: Linux; CPE: cpe:/o:Ubuntu:Ubuntu2.13 (Ubuntu Linux; protocol 2.0)

Service detection performed. Please report any incorrect results at https://nmap.org/submit/
Nmap done: 1 IP address (1 host up) scanned in 39.35 seconds
```




Scan Results

| | SSL Observatory (12/2010) | Our TLS scan (10/2011) | Our SSH scans (2-4/2012) |
|--------------------------------|------------------------------|---------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Hosts with open port 443 or 22 | ≈16,200,000 | 28,923,800 | 23,237,081 |
| Completed protocol handshakes | 7,704,837 | 12,828,613 | 10,216,363 |
| Distinct RSA public keys | 3,933,366 | 5,656,519 | 3,821,639 |
| Distinct DSA public keys | 1,906 | 6,241 | 2,789,662 |
| Distinct TLS certificates | 4,021,766 | 5,847,957 | — |
| Trusted by major browsers | 1,455,391 | 1,956,267 | — |

Table 1: **Internet-wide scan results** — We exhaustively scanned the public IPv4 address space for TLS and SSH servers listening on ports 443 and 22, respectively. Our results constitute the largest such network survey reported to date. For comparison, we also show statistics for the EFF SSL Observatory’s most recent public dataset [18].

Side note...



Efficient Factorization

- Paper uses a combination of product trees and remainder trees to efficiently compute GCDs for their moduli
- Computed GCDs for 11.1M moduli in about 5h, this would be much faster today




Figure 1: **Computing all-pairs GCDs efficiently** — We computed the GCD of every pair of RSA moduli in our dataset using an algorithm due to Bernstein [6].

Repeated Keys are Common

- Authors found 61% of TLS hosts **served the same key**
- Why does this happen in practice?

Repeated Keys are Common

- Authors found 61% of TLS hosts **served the same key**
- Why does this happen in practice?
 - Hosting providers might share keys for ease of deployment
 - Some keying material is embedded in firmware as *default* – **5.23%** of hosts were manufacturer defaults

Who is putting bad keys into the world?

- The authors identified many vulnerable device vendors and models. How?

Who is putting bad keys into the world?

- The authors identified many vulnerable device vendors and models. How?
 - There's **a lot** of information volunteered in TLS certificates...

Who is putting bad keys into the world?

- The authors identified many vulnerable device vendors and models. How?
 - There's **a lot** of information volunteered in TLS certificates...
- Authors identified vulnerable devices from 27 manufacturers. What were these manufacturers creating?

Who is putting bad keys into the world?

- The authors identified many vulnerable device vendors and models. How?
 - There's **a lot** of information volunteered in TLS certificates...
- Authors identified vulnerable devices from 27 manufacturers. What were these manufacturers creating?
 - Enterprise-grade routers, server management, VPN devices, security systems, consumer routers... things you *totally* want having bad crypto

What did the authors find?

| | Our TLS Scan | | Our SSH Scans | |
|--|--------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| Number of live hosts | 12,828,613 | (100.00%) | 10,216,363 | (100.00%) |
| ... using repeated keys | 7,770,232 | (60.50%) | 6,642,222 | (65.00%) |
| ... using vulnerable repeated keys | 714,243 | (5.57%) | 981,166 | (9.60%) |
| ... using default certificates or default keys | 670,391 | (5.23%) | | |
| ... using low-entropy repeated keys | 43,852 | (0.34%) | | |
| ... using RSA keys we could factor | 64,081 | (0.50%) | 2,459 | (0.03%) |
| ... using DSA keys we could compromise | | | 105,728 | (1.03%) |
| ... using Debian weak keys | 4,147 | (0.03%) | 53,141 | (0.52%) |
| ... using 512-bit RSA keys | 123,038 | (0.96%) | 8,459 | (0.08%) |
| ... identified as a vulnerable device model | 985,031 | (7.68%) | 1,070,522 | (10.48%) |
| ... model using low-entropy repeated keys | 314,640 | (2.45%) | | |

Table 2: Summary of vulnerabilities— We analyzed our TLS and SSH scan results to measure the population of hosts exhibiting several entropy-related vulnerabilities. These include use of repeated keys, use of RSA keys that were factorable due to repeated primes, and use of DSA keys that were compromised by repeated signature randomness. Under the theory that vulnerable repeated keys were generated by embedded or headless devices with defective designs, we also report the number of hosts that we identified as these device models. Many of these hosts may be at risk even though we did not specifically observe repeats of their keys.

What did the authors find?

| | Our TLS Scan | | Our SSH Scans | |
|--|--------------|-----------|---------------|-----------|
| Number of live hosts | 12,828,613 | (100.00%) | 10,216,363 | (100.00%) |
| ... using repeated keys | 7,770,232 | (60.50%) | 6,642,222 | (65.00%) |
| ... using vulnerable repeated keys | 714,243 | (5.57%) | 981,166 | (9.60%) |
| ... using default certificates or default keys | 670,391 | (5.23%) | | |
| ... using low-entropy repeated keys | 43,852 | (0.34%) | | |
| ... using RSA keys we could factor | 64,081 | (0.50%) | 2,459 | (0.03%) |
| ... using DSA keys we could compromise | | | 105,728 | (1.03%) |
| ... using Debian weak keys | 4,147 | (0.03%) | 53,141 | (0.52%) |
| ... using 512-bit RSA keys | 123,038 | (0.96%) | 8,459 | (0.08%) |
| ... identified as a vulnerable device model | 985,031 | (7.68%) | 1,070,522 | (10.48%) |
| ... model using low-entropy repeated keys | 314,640 | (2.45%) | | |

Table 2: Summary of vulnerabilities— We analyzed our TLS and SSH scan results to measure the population of hosts exhibiting several entropy-related vulnerabilities. These include use of repeated keys, use of RSA keys that were factorable due to repeated primes, and use of DSA keys that were compromised by repeated signature randomness. Under the theory that vulnerable repeated keys were generated by embedded or headless devices with defective designs, we also report the number of hosts that we identified as these device models. Many of these hosts may be at risk even though we did not specifically observe repeats of their keys.

Why is this happening?

- What is entropy?



Why is this happening?

- What is entropy?
 - “The amount of unpredictable randomness” in a physical system



Why is this happening?

- What is entropy?
 - “The amount of unpredictable randomness” in a physical system
- Where does entropy come from?



Why is this happening?

- What is entropy?
 - “The amount of unpredictable randomness” in a physical system
- Where does entropy come from?
 - Uninitialized contents of memory when the kernel starts, startup clock time, disk access timings, “old” entropy



Why is this happening?

- What is entropy?
 - “The amount of unpredictable randomness” in a physical system
- Where does entropy come from?
 - Uninitialized contents of memory when the kernel starts, startup clock time, disk access timings, “old” entropy
- What did the authors discover about headless / embedded devices?



Implementations are tricky

- Linux provides two sources of randomness: /dev/random and /dev/urandom. What's the difference between the two?



Implementations are tricky

- Linux provides two sources of randomness: /dev/random and /dev/urandom. What's the difference between the two?
- In 2012, /dev/random was **blocking**, /dev/urandom was **non-blocking**, now they're mostly the same after initialization



Implementations are tricky

- Linux provides two sources of randomness: /dev/random and /dev/urandom. What's the difference between the two?
 - In 2012, /dev/random was **blocking**, /dev/urandom was **non-blocking**, now they're mostly the same after initialization
- People preferred the **non-blocking** interface for randomness (even when the randomness was predictable). Why?



Meta-thoughts on the paper

- What do we think about this paper? Did we enjoy it, why or why not?
- Why do we think this paper won so many awards when the results only impacted such a small % of hosts?
- What were some limitations of the study you can think of?

Next time...

- More TLS!
- One of them is my paper!
- Work on your projects. Midpoint check-ins are soon :)